State local territorial and tribal rules · Page 4 of 12

Selected findings from library records with scoped primary-source review.

Research reference · Consumer guides and topic map

Plain-English guides on this topic

Missouri earned wage access rulemaking and fund

Library record saved 2026-11-12

Research scope and limits

Actual rules, allocation and disbursement remain held.

  • Section 361.749.9 authorizes the Division of Finance to promulgate rules necessary to administer the section, subject to chapter 536 and §536.028 where applicable. It makes the section and chapter 536 nonseverable and invalidates the grant and any rule proposed or adopted after August 28, 2023 if the specified legislative rule review, delay, or disapproval powers are later held unconstitutional.

    OneSection.aspx · revisor.mo.gov

  • Section 361.749.11 directs immediate forwarding of all revenue collected by or paid to the director under the section to the director of revenue for deposit into the Consumer Licensing Fund.

    OneSection.aspx · revisor.mo.gov

  • Section 361.170.5 establishes the Consumer Licensing Fund in the state treasury for statutorily designated fees, with the treasurer as custodian and disbursement authority under the listed sections. It dedicates the fund to eligible Division of Finance administration costs outside the listed other funds, bars biennial reversion to general revenue, and credits investment earnings back to the fund.

    OneSection.aspx · revisor.mo.gov

Montana pass 17 post-award corrections

Library record saved 2026-11-10

Research scope and limits

Four post-award corrections. Q001 locator repair remains partial with five judicial locators and two narrative attributions held. Controlling construction, preemption and actual application remain open.

  • In its July30 2025 order to show cause in McConnell & Malek Enterprises v Proof Mark, Inc., N.D.Cal.23-cv-00010-LJC, the court described DeMartini v Johns,693 F.Appx534 as an unpublished Ninth Circuit decision and recounted that it affirmed denial of vacatur but reversed Rule59(e) amendment of the award’s interest calculation. The district court read that decision as suggesting sua-sponte enforcement of FAA§12 could be appropriate, and ordered further briefing rather than resolving that issue in this order. District-court characterization only. This does not supply DeMartini original official opinion, original pinpoint verification, controlling precedential status, a final sua-sponte deadline holding, subsequent disposition or actual-case application. Native source has footnote docket typo23-cv-03929-JCS; no reliance on typo as identity.

    USCOURTS-cand-3_23-cv-00010-15.pdf · www.govinfo.gov

Montana pawnbroker register and redemption date

Library record saved 2026-11-14

Research scope and limits

The statute requires availability to peace officers. General public access is unverified. E186Q retains the hold on substantive redemption period, notice, default sale timing and surplus or other disposition mechanics. The 2025 display and printed-code priority disclaimer are verified. Later changes and local applicability remain held. No duplicate exact citation found in the adopted S_MT findings, claims or coverage search. MCA §31-1-402 in the 2025 display specifies the register and peace-officer inspection, including recording the redemption date. It establishes no redemption, forfeiture, or other deadline. The printed version prevails.

  • In its 2025 display, Montana Code Annotated §31-1-402 requires each pawnbroker or junk dealer to keep a register describing each article pawned or purchased and recording the transaction date, redemption date, name of the person pawning or selling the article, and amount loaned or paid. The register must be available for any peace officer to inspect.

    0310-0010-0040-0020.html · mca.legmt.gov

Montana Monarch later treatment of Peeler

Library record saved 2026-11-11

Research scope and limits

Original Peeler body, unresolved delegation holdings, FAA or MUAA choice and actual agreement and application remain open.

  • Official Montana Supreme Court publication identifies 2025 MT 184, DA 24-0760, filed August 19, 2025.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

  • The majority cites Peeler ¶11 for de novo review of rulings on motions to compel arbitration for correctness under the FAA or MUAA as applicable.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

  • The majority applies the three Downey waiver factors, knowledge, inconsistent acts and resulting prejudice, and expressly declines to decide Morgan's application after concluding the burden under Downey was satisfied. This is the waiver disposition of Monarch.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

  • The majority affirms the district court's determination of waiver after Petra reentered litigation without asserting the right in the stipulation to set aside entry of default or in its answer. Chief Justice Swanson's dissent begins separately at ¶15.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

  • Chief Justice Swanson's dissent, at ¶19, invokes Peeler ¶¶12–13 for the history of looking to federal FAA interpretation when interpreting the MUAA.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

  • The dissent, at ¶30, discusses Peeler ¶24's rejection of waiver based on pre-litigation efforts and compares timing at ¶31. The description of Peeler is the dissent's characterization.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

Montana tracked findings

Library record saved 2026-11-11

Research scope and limits

Statewide Rule 9 currentness, form, registry, additional precedent and actual application remain held.

Montana post-award authority, late residual

Library record saved 2026-11-11

Research scope and limits

Original DeMartini opinion, later treatment and actual relief remain held.

  • Tesla Motors, Inc. v. Balan, No. 22-16623, is a published Ninth Circuit opinion filed April 14, 2025. The court vacated the district court’s order confirming the award and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In that §9 proceeding it applied Badgerow’s no-look-through rule and held that the face of the zero-dollar confirmation petition did not establish diversity’s amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. This was vacatur of the confirmation order on jurisdictional grounds.

    22-16623.pdf · cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov

Montana dated proof-of-service document guidance

Library record saved 2026-11-11

Research scope and limits

Current Rule 9 body and amendment chain, official statewide form, actual service and acceptance remain unresolved.

  • The Montana courts’ older limited-court training handout distinguished an officer certificate, written acknowledgment for mail, and a nonofficer affidavit in its proof-of-service instructions, including proof details and the nonofficer’s identification of the person served. The current displayed civil benchbook index describes its contents as guidelines for individual judges.

    benchbook2.pdf · courts.mt.gov civil · courts.mt.gov

Persuasive formation and delegation decision

Library record saved 2026-11-11

Research scope and limits

Montana binding authority, actual assent, contract, assignment, supersession and delegation remain unresolved.

  • The Tenth Circuit held it was proper for the district court to decide whether the cardholders and the entity invoking the clause agreed to arbitrate. Delegation applied after judicial determination of formation. The court assumed without deciding that those parties did not agree and concluded the motion should have been granted on equitable estoppel grounds.

    USCOURTS-ca10-24-02044-0.pdf · www.govinfo.gov

Allied-Bruce Terminix v. Dobson and FAA interstate-commerce coverage

Library record saved 2026-11-13

Research scope and limits

Official Allied-Bruce majority, preserve FAA commerce-in-fact rule, state and federal application, general contract defenses, factual nexus and reversal and remand. Individual application held.

  • The Court read the FAA §2 term involving commerce as equivalent in reach to affecting commerce, signaling exercise of Congress’s commerce power to the full. A written arbitration provision in a contract evidencing a transaction meets the commerce language when that transaction in fact involves interstate commerce, even when the parties did not contemplate an interstate connection.

    usrep513265.pdf · tile.loc.gov 513bv.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

  • The Court adhered to Southland’s rule that the FAA applies in state as well as federal court and displaces conflicting state antiarbitration law for FAA-covered agreements. In this posture the Alabama court had relied on a state ban on written predispute arbitration agreements and found the FAA inapplicable under its contemplation test. The majority preserved general contract-law grounds for revoking contracts and rejected state policy placing arbitration clauses on an unequal footing.

    usrep513265.pdf · tile.loc.gov 513bv.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

  • In No. 93-1001, reported at 513 U.S. 265, Justice Breyer delivered the Court’s opinion on January 18, 1995. The parties did not dispute interstate commerce in fact. The majority identified the multistate businesses and treatment and repair materials from outside Alabama. It reversed the Alabama Supreme Court’s 628 So. 2d 354 judgment and remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion.

    usrep513265.pdf · tile.loc.gov 513bv.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle on FAA stays sought by nonsignatories

Library record saved 2026-11-13

Research scope and limits

Official Arthur Andersen majority. Preserve interlocutory appeal versus merits entitlement, state-law nonparty enforceability examples, reserved federal jurisdiction issue, reversal and remand. Actual estoppel held.

  • The Court held that a litigant who seeks an FAA §3 stay can immediately appeal an order refusing that stay under §16(a)(1)(A), regardless of whether the litigant is entitled to the stay on the merits. The category of order determines appellate jurisdiction. Each petitioner expressly sought a §3 stay, so the Sixth Circuit had jurisdiction over the district court’s refusal. The majority separately left open the distinct federal subject-matter-jurisdiction issue described in footnote 3.

    usrep556624.pdf · tile.loc.gov 556bv.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

  • Section 3 allows a litigant already in federal court to seek a stay for an issue referable to arbitration under a written agreement. A nonparty to that agreement can invoke §3 if relevant state contract law makes the written provision enforceable for its benefit or against the third party for the particular dispute. The majority lists examples of traditional doctrines, including assumption, veil piercing, alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-party beneficiary, waiver and estoppel. These are examples of state-law routes, with entitlement dependent on the applicable law and facts.

    usrep556624.pdf · tile.loc.gov 556bv.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

  • The petitioners invoked equitable estoppel based on investment-management agreements made with Bricolage. The district court refused the stay and the Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal. In No. 08-146, reported at 556 U.S. 624, Justice Scalia delivered the Court’s May 4, 2009 opinion reversing the Sixth Circuit judgment and remanding. The Court left for possible decision on remand whether the relevant state law recognized equitable estoppel in these circumstances, the governing standard and the petitioners’ entitlement to relief.

    usrep556624.pdf · tile.loc.gov 556bv.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion on FAA preemption and compelled class arbitration

Library record saved 2026-11-13

Research scope and limits

Official Concepcion majority. Preserve contract scope, FAA §2 general defenses, Discover Bank preemption and compulsory class procedures versus consensual aggregation. Footnote 6 example does not decide a specific notice rule. Preserve reversal and remand; other contracts held.

  • The majority describes the parties’ agreed controlling December 2006 revision. The agreement provided for arbitration of their disputes, required claims in the parties’ individual capacities and barred class or representative participation. Footnote 2 states that the arbitrator could neither consolidate more than one person’s claims nor preside over class or representative proceedings. The reported agreement also allowed either party to use small claims court instead of arbitration. These were terms of the contract before the Court.

    usrep563333.pdf · tile.loc.gov

  • The majority preserved generally applicable defenses such as fraud, duress and unconscionability, subject to FAA §2. It excludes defenses that apply only to arbitration or derive their meaning from arbitration, as well as state-law rules that obstruct the FAA’s objectives. Discover Bank treated class waivers as unconscionable in the specified setting of consumer adhesion, predictably small damages and an alleged scheme to cheat numerous consumers out of individually small amounts. The Court held that the FAA preempted that California rule.

    usrep563333.pdf · tile.loc.gov 563bv.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

  • The majority distinguished class procedures imposed through Discover Bank from consensual aggregation. Its stated reasons included loss of bilateral informality, added cost and formality, procedures protecting absent parties, higher stakes and limited judicial review. Footnote 6 recognizes that states can address adhesion-contract concerns within FAA constraints. It gives highlighting as an example without deciding a particular notice requirement. The holding concerns compulsory class procedures under the identified rule.

    usrep563333.pdf · tile.loc.gov

  • The telephone customers’ suit over taxes on advertised free phones was consolidated with a putative class action. The district court denied AT&T’s motion to compel bilateral arbitration on the Discover Bank basis, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. In No. 09-893, reported at 563 U.S. 333, Justice Scalia delivered the Court’s opinion on April 27, 2011, reversing the Ninth Circuit and remanding for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

    usrep563333.pdf · tile.loc.gov 09-893.htm · www.supremecourt.gov 563bv.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

Big Sky Vacation Rentals: official docket identity and later procedural citations

Library record saved 2026-11-13

Research scope and limits

Official February 2019 procedural order and later procedural citations only. Stowe merits and disposition held.

  • A February 4, 2019 Montana Supreme Court order identifies DA 18-0614, Big Sky Vacation Rentals, Inc. as appellee and PointCentral, LLC as appellant. Its operative text grants Big Sky a briefing extension through March 13, 2019. The order provides identity and procedural evidence only.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

  • Flowers, 2020 MT 150 ¶6, cites Stowe v. Big Sky Vacation Rentals, Inc., 2019 MT 288 ¶12, for de novo review of dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Dickson, 2020 MT 196 ¶2 n.1, cites the same Stowe paragraph for generally taking well-pleaded factual assertions as true in the claimant’s favor when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. These are procedural uses in the later courts’ own opinions.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

Buckeye Check Cashing official opinion on payday contract severability

Library record saved 2026-11-13

Research scope and limits

The packet is limited to Buckeye’s signed deferred-payment agreements and federal validity allocation. Whether a Montana contract was formed, whether an arbitration provision or delegation is specifically challenged, FAA coverage or procedural mechanisms in a particular forum, actual charges and later case treatment remain held. No remand outcome is inferred. Advance the original Buckeye opinion only. Preserve the whole-contract validity distinction, the express reservation of agreement formation, and the unresolved Florida merits. Later treatment, Montana law and application to any particular agreement remain held.

  • In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), decided February 21, 2006, Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. Customers signed deferred-deposit agreements with arbitration terms for their transactions. Their putative Florida class action alleged usurious finance charges and violations of lending and consumer-protection law rendering the agreements criminal on their face. The trial court denied compulsion, the intermediate appellate court reversed, and the Florida Supreme Court reversed that ruling.

    USREPORTS-546-440 · www.govinfo.gov USREPORTS-546-440.pdf · www.govinfo.gov

  • The Court distinguished a challenge specifically to the arbitration provision from a challenge to the whole contract, including one alleging that an illegal term renders the whole contract invalid. As substantive federal arbitration law, the arbitration provision is severable, and a whole-contract validity challenge goes to the arbitrator in the first instance. The consumers’ alleged usurious finance charge challenged their agreements as a whole. Florida’s void-versus-voidable distinction did not change the federal allocation.

    USREPORTS-546-440.pdf · www.govinfo.gov

  • Footnote 1 expressly limits Buckeye to validity and distinguishes whether the alleged obligor and obligee ever concluded any agreement. It identifies cited cases addressing signature, authority to bind a principal and mental capacity to assent, and states that this opinion does not speak to those issues. Buckeye does not determine a later dispute about whether a particular agreement was formed.

    USREPORTS-546-440.pdf · www.govinfo.gov

  • The Court reaffirmed that substantive federal separability and the whole-contract allocation apply in state and federal courts. It addressed the respondents’ reliance on FAA §§3 and 4 by explaining the substantive §2 basis of the precedent. It reversed the Florida Supreme Court and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The judgment did not decide the allegations of usury or the merits of the state-law claims.

    USREPORTS-546-440.pdf · www.govinfo.gov

Bucy v. Edward Jones on securities arbitration and limited injunctive relief

Library record saved 2026-11-13

Research scope and limits

Official Bucy original. Preserve threshold preservation, interim relief, totality, securities employment facts, scope, reversal and remand.

  • In Bucy v. Edward Jones & Co., 2019 MT 173, DA 18-0493, decided July 30, 2019, the Montana Supreme Court held that Bucy had preserved his threshold enforceability challenge without cross-appealing. He prevailed below on whether his post-termination claims were within the agreements’ scope, had timely challenged enforceability below, and the threshold validity question was a necessary part of the arbitrability question raised on appeal.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

  • The 2003 employment agreement’s reserved right for Edward Jones to seek interim protection against misuse of trade secrets and proprietary information pending arbitration preserved the status quo. The Court considered the broad matters mutually submitted to arbitration and the supplemental judicial relief available under the governing framework. On this record, the employer’s limited right did not make the agreement illusory, lacking in mutuality, unreasonably one-sided or oppressive. The holding concerns this language and securities employment setting.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

  • The Court held that the absence of an explicit explanation and waiver of Montana constitutional rights did not make the 1998 Form U4 and 2003 employment arbitration agreements unenforceable under this record’s totality. It considered clear contract language, opportunity for counsel, absence of extraordinary duress and the role of SEC-approved NASD rules. The forms were adhesive, but the Court held they were not equitably unconscionable in the circumstances.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

  • The Court held that Bucy’s particular pre- and post-termination claims arose from the business activities of a member or associated person and fell within FINRA Rule 13200(a), his 1998 NASD Form U4 and his 2003 employment agreement. It reversed the August 9, 2018 judgment denying arbitration of the post-termination claims and remanded with directions to order arbitration of all claims and dismiss this action.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

Coinbase v. Bielski and the FAA interlocutory appeal stay

Library record saved 2026-11-13

Research scope and limits

Official Coinbase preliminary print. Preserve mandatory pending §16(a) appeal stay, separate §3, unrelated matters concession, frivolousness discussion, reversal and remand and partial DIG. Subsequent outcome held.

  • The official preliminary print identifies Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, No. 22–105, 599 U.S. 736 (2023), decided June 23, 2023. The Northern District of California denied Coinbase’s motion to compel arbitration in a putative class action. Coinbase took an interlocutory appeal under 9 U.S.C. §16(a), and both the District Court and Ninth Circuit declined to stay the district proceedings while that appeal was pending.

    599us1r48_986b.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

  • A federal district court must stay its pretrial and trial proceedings while a §16(a) interlocutory appeal from denial of a motion to compel arbitration is ongoing. Section 16(a) does not itself specify a stay. Applying Griggs, the majority reasoned that the issue of which forum should hear the case makes the entire case essentially involved in the appeal. Footnote 2 attributes to Coinbase the concession that unrelated matters, such as costs and fees, may continue. The opinion distinguishes FAA §3’s stay pending arbitration.

    599us1r48_986b.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

  • The majority said a party may ask the court of appeals for summary affirmance, expedition or dismissal of an interlocutory appeal as frivolous. It noted a district-court certification process in nearly every circuit and possible appellate sanctions where appropriate. Bielski did not argue that Coinbase’s own appeal was frivolous. The discussion leaves circuit-specific procedures and any particular frivolousness determination open.

    599us1r48_986b.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

  • The Court reversed and remanded as to Bielski, anticipating expedited Ninth Circuit consideration of the interlocutory appeal from the arbitration denial. The Court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted as to Suski and the other respondents in this docket. The Court’s judgment addresses the stay while the underlying appeal is pending, and the decision supplies no outcome of that appeal.

    20230725085159901_EFiling%2022-105 · www.supremecourt.gov 599us1r48_986b.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

Coinbase v. Suski and conflicting arbitrability provisions

Library record saved 2026-11-13

Research scope and limits

Official Suski majority for earlier S022. Preserve competing contracts gateway, severability assumption and forfeiture, affirmance and unresolved California supersession merits. Montana overlay remains distinct.

  • Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski, No. 23–3, 602 U.S. 143 (2024), was decided May 23, 2024. The parties’ User Agreement delegated arbitrability to an arbitrator. The later sweepstakes Official Rules selected California state and federal courts for controversies about the promotion. The District Court held that the later rules controlled under California contract law and denied the motion to compel. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

    602us1r26_k537.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

  • When the parties agree to two contracts, one sending arbitrability to arbitration and the other explicitly or implicitly sending arbitrability to courts, a court decides which contract controls. Traditional contract principles govern that inquiry before either disputed provision can be enforced. The majority distinguished a single contract that delegates arbitrability, where courts send arbitrability disputes to arbitration absent a successful challenge to the delegation.

    602us1r26_k537.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

  • Assuming without deciding that severability applied, the Court found it satisfied. A challenge applying equally to the whole contract and the arbitration or delegation provision must be addressed by a court. The respondents specifically contested the delegation by arguing that the later rules superseded the prior agreement to arbitrate sweepstakes-related disputes. Coinbase forfeited its contrary preservation argument by omitting it in the Ninth Circuit.

    602us1r26_k537.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

  • The unanimous Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit. Its holding selects the decisionmaker for the contract dispute. The Court expressly declined to decide whether the Ninth Circuit correctly applied California law to conclude that the later forum clause superseded the earlier delegation.

    23-3.html · www.supremecourt.gov 602us1r26_k537.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

CompuCredit v. Greenwood and arbitration of CROA claims

Library record saved 2026-11-13

Research scope and limits

Complete exact claim windows from sealed original, including S04 19145–19163. Preserve prior substantive scope and original review.

  • CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, No. 10–948, 565 U.S. 95 (2012), was decided January 10, 2012. A federal putative class complaint alleged misleading representations about rebuilding credit and multiple account-opening fees on a card offered under an agreement with a binding arbitration provision. The District Court denied the motion to compel on CROA nonarbitrability grounds, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded.

    565BV.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

  • CROA §1679c(a) requires a covered organization to provide a specified statement before any contract is executed. The majority read the reference to a right to sue as informing consumers of their §1679g(a) right to enforce liability for statutory noncompliance. The disclosure provision creates the right to receive that statement. Section 1679g’s references to actions, class actions and courts did not establish a right to initial judicial enforcement.

    565BV.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

  • CROA §1679f(a) voids consumer waivers of statutory protections or rights and prohibits their enforcement. The majority found that selecting arbitration for the initial forum did not waive a CROA right to initial judicial enforcement, because the Act conferred no such right. The cited provisions together supplied no contrary congressional command overriding the FAA. The Court concluded the FAA required the arbitration agreement at issue to be enforced according to its terms.

    565BV.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

  • The majority’s footnote 1 expressly left unresolved whether petitioners fit the statutory credit repair organization definition. The decision addresses the forum for claims under CROA and leaves any actual CROA coverage, contract formation, substantive statutory remedies and liability or fee merits for separate analysis.

    565BV.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

Doctor’s Associates v. Casarotto and Montana arbitration-specific notice preemption

Library record saved 2026-11-13

Research scope and limits

Official U.S. Reports Casarotto majority and docket identity. FAA-covered arbitration-specific first-page notice displaced, generally applicable defenses distinguished, conspicuousness theory undecided. Preserve reversal and remand and historical statute scope; current law and individual contract application held.

  • In Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996), the Court applied the FAA §2 requirement to treat arbitration provisions on the same footing as other contracts. Generally applicable defenses such as fraud, duress and unconscionability can apply within §2. A state rule applicable solely to arbitration may not invalidate an FAA-covered agreement. The majority also rejects reliance on the uniqueness of arbitration as a basis for an unconscionability ruling.

    usrep517681.pdf · tile.loc.gov 517bv.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

  • The version of Mont. Code Ann. §27-5-114(4) before the Court conditioned enforceability on notice of arbitration in underlined capital letters on the first page. The franchise agreement contained its clause on page nine and failed that notice condition. The Court held that §2 displaces the special notice requirement for agreements covered by the FAA. It distinguished Volt’s agreed procedural rule governing the order of proceedings. Footnote 3 limits review to the Montana judgment resting on that particular statute and leaves counsel’s proposed generally applicable conspicuousness theory outside the decision.

    usrep517681.pdf · tile.loc.gov 517bv.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

  • No. 95-559 was argued April 16 and decided May 20, 1996. Justice Ginsburg delivered the Court’s opinion and Justice Thomas dissented. The majority records that after an earlier federal vacatur and remand for consideration of Allied-Bruce the Montana Supreme Court adhered to its ruling, reported at 274 Mont. 3, 901 P.2d 596. In this 1996 decision the Supreme Court reversed that judgment and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion.

    usrep517681.pdf · tile.loc.gov 517bv.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

Supersession and arbitration delegation

Library record saved 2026-11-12

Research scope and limits

Montana authority, actual contract formation, delegation, applicability and current treatment remain held. Earlier finding remains open.

  • In precedential Field Intelligence Inc. v. Xylem Dewatering Solutions Inc., No. 21-2087, filed September 13, 2022, the Third Circuit treated alleged supersession of a 2013 NDA by a 2017 software subscription agreement as a threshold question for the court because the alleged supersession would extinguish the earlier arbitration and delegation agreement itself.

    23-3_879d.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov 212087p.pdf · www2.ca3.uscourts.gov

  • The Third Circuit held that the 2017 agreement did not supersede the 2013 NDA. The later agreement had subject-matter-limited integration language and a New Jersey court forum clause for its own disputes. The earlier contract required an express signed written amendment or waiver, and the later contract did not mention the earlier one. Arbitration remained available for claims within the earlier agreement’s scope.

    23-3_879d.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov 212087p.pdf · www2.ca3.uscourts.gov

  • The court reversed the injunction against arbitration, vacated the ruling on the motion to stay the federal action pending arbitration, and remanded for consideration of that motion. The later Supreme Court Coinbase opinion cited Field Intelligence at 49 F.4th 351, 356 for the existence-of-agreement characterization of the supersession question.

    23-3_879d.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov 212087p.pdf · www2.ca3.uscourts.gov

First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan official workout arbitrability opinion

Library record saved 2026-11-13

Research scope and limits

The original federal opinion provides the scoped delegation and review rule. Montana contract formation, a later or different agreement, assignee or nonsignatory state-law enforcement, actual objection, liability and case outcome remain held. Later treatment and merits of the parties’ underlying arbitration were outside this packet. Earlier finding S_MT-P16-Q001 advances only for the supplemental original First Options opinion. The reserved merits arbitrability question, later treatment, Montana contract formation and case application remain open.

  • In First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995), Justice Breyer wrote for the Court. MK Investments signed the only one of four debt workout documents containing an arbitration clause. The individual Kaplans did not personally sign that document and filed written objections to arbitrability with the exchange panel. The panel ruled for First Options. The district court confirmed the award, and the Third Circuit reversed confirmation as to the Kaplans.

    context · www.govinfo.gov USREPORTS-514-938.pdf · www.govinfo.gov

  • The Court distinguished personal liability for the debt, agreement to arbitrate the merits, and who primarily decides arbitrability. An agreement to submit arbitrability itself gives the arbitrator’s decision the usual deferential review of matters submitted to arbitration. Without such an agreement, the court determines arbitrability independently. Courts generally apply ordinary state-law contract formation principles, with the qualification that agreement to delegate arbitrability requires clear and unmistakable evidence. The Court distinguished this inquiry from ambiguity about the merits scope of an already valid arbitration agreement.

    USREPORTS-514-938.pdf · www.govinfo.gov

  • On the record before the Court, the Kaplans’ presentation of a written jurisdictional objection to the panel did not show clear agreement to be bound by the panel’s arbitrability decision. The Court considered their express opposition and the fact that their company was already arbitrating. It held that courts independently reviewed arbitrability in their dispute.

    USREPORTS-514-938.pdf · www.govinfo.gov

  • The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals uses ordinary review of the district court decision, including clear error for fact findings and de novo review of law. It affirmed the Third Circuit judgment. The factbound question whether the merits dispute was actually arbitrable lay outside the scope of certiorari, so the Supreme Court did not resolve it.

    USREPORTS-514-938.pdf · www.govinfo.gov

Granite Rock official opinion on arbitration agreement formation date and scope

Library record saved 2026-11-13

Research scope and limits

The holding concerns the particular labor CBA and arbitration demand, with the alternative retroactivity contention unresolved on its merits. Montana consumer-contract formation, timing, incorporation, assignment, statutory interaction and actual account facts remain held. No later-treatment or broad ratification rule is inferred. Advance only the original Granite Rock opinion for the identified earlier finding. The holding concerns the particular labor agreement and arbitration demand. The retroactivity argument was waived, and Montana consumer-contract application, other source groups and later treatment remain held.

  • In Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287 (2010), decided June 24, 2010, Justice Thomas delivered the Court’s opinion. The dispute arose from a strike and a collective-bargaining agreement with a no-strike provision. The contested date was when that agreement had been ratified and formed. At the point the arbitration demand was considered, Granite Rock conceded the arbitration clause’s formation and validity.

    USREPORTS-561-287 · www.govinfo.gov USREPORTS-561-287.pdf · www.govinfo.gov

  • The Court stated that contract formation disputes generally are for courts and that arbitration may be ordered only when the court is satisfied that the parties agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute. Its framework calls for the court to resolve contested formation of the arbitration agreement and, absent a valid provision specifically assigning those issues to the arbitrator, contested enforceability or applicability. Its presumption of arbitrability addresses ambiguous scope of a validly formed and enforceable arbitration agreement and permits compulsion only if the presumption is unrebutted.

    USREPORTS-561-287.pdf · www.govinfo.gov

  • The Court held that the district court had to resolve the July-versus-August ratification date to determine consent to arbitrate this particular dispute. On the theory before the Court, the CBA’s narrower clause for disputes arising under the agreement did not cover its own formation-date defense merely because the related no-strike claim might come within the clause. The opinion left other CBA ratification disputes open and expressly preserved parties’ ability to agree to arbitrate disputes arising from past events. It deemed the asserted alternative retroactive effective-date argument waived and did not decide its merits.

    USREPORTS-561-287.pdf · www.govinfo.gov

  • Granite Rock’s suit seeking enforcement of other CBA matters did not establish implied consent to arbitrate the formation-date issue. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s arbitrability ruling and remanded. It separately affirmed dismissal of claims against the international union to the extent the claims depended on creating a new federal common-law tort cause of action under LMRA §301(a).

    USREPORTS-561-287.pdf · www.govinfo.gov

Green Tree v. Bazzle official consumer credit class-arbitration opinion and vote

Library record saved 2026-11-13

Research scope and limits

The original source establishes Bazzle’s vacatur and remand, with the allocation reasoning attributed to the four-Justice plurality. The later Stolt-Nielsen extract verifies only its majority’s description of Bazzle and its own limited decisionmaker reservation. Current class-arbitration or delegation rules beyond the specified opinions, present South Carolina law, actual Montana or settlement contracts, merits or award collection, and the post-remand outcome remain outside the verified scope. The Bazzle rationale is a plurality only. Preserve Stevens’s separate position, the disposition and Stolt-Nielsen’s express reservation of the decisionmaker issue. Current full treatment, Montana and individual application remain held.

  • In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003), decided June 23, 2003, the two groups of South Carolina borrowers had a home-improvement loan or mobile-home purchase loans with materially identical arbitration provisions. They brought separate damages actions alleging omission of a required form permitting them to name their own lawyers and insurance agents. The trial court certified the Bazzle class and compelled arbitration. In the Lackey proceeding the arbitrator certified the class after the state appellate court reversed denial of arbitration. Both awards were confirmed in the trial court. The South Carolina Supreme Court consolidated the cases and treated the contracts’ silence as permitting class arbitration under its interpretation of state law.

    USREPORTS-539-444 · www.govinfo.gov USREPORTS-539-444.pdf · www.govinfo.gov

  • Justice Breyer announced the judgment and wrote for four Justices. The plurality viewed whether these contracts forbade class arbitration as a question of contract interpretation about the kind of arbitration procedure agreed to, which the broad language of these agreements committed to the arbitrator. It regarded the record as strongly suggesting that the arbitrator in both proceedings had followed a court’s interpretation, warranting remand so the contract question could be decided in arbitration.

    USREPORTS-539-444.pdf · www.govinfo.gov

  • Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment and dissented in part. He viewed the state court’s result as legally correct and would have affirmed. He described the decisionmaker issue as arguable, stated that Green Tree challenged the merits without claiming a wrong decisionmaker, and joined the judgment to avoid the absence of a controlling judgment. The Court vacated the South Carolina Supreme Court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

    USREPORTS-539-444.pdf · www.govinfo.gov

  • In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 678–680 (2010), the majority explained that Bazzle produced no majority decision on who determines whether the contract is silent as to class arbitration, what standard applies, or whether class arbitration was properly ordered there. Stolt-Nielsen left the decisionmaker question open in that case because the parties expressly assigned the issue to the arbitral panel and did not challenge that assignment.

    559bv.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

Harris v. W6LS June 2026 amended opinion, formation and delegation

Library record saved 2026-11-13

Research scope and limits

Incremental federal Seventh Circuit authority for S_MT-P16-Q001. Existing Montana and Supreme Court gateway propositions and the D025/E161N Jackson arbitration or tribal-court coverage are separate. This pass establishes no Montana holding, Jackson holding, tribal jurisdiction, immunity, or case-specific application elsewhere. The full June amended and March original court responses, June rehearing order, and exact PDF payloads are preserved. The March version is used for the documented amendment comparison only. The E161N amendment original is reused byte for byte and matched to the earlier READY hash. The November 13, 2026 Supreme Court docket capture has no later procedural entries beyond November 5. It does not establish any result after the observation, or an exhaustive later-treatment check. No underlying loan merits, debt amount, class outcome, current tribal code, other contract or party-specific applicability was verified. Verified exact original and amended opinion reads and companion order. June 5 footnote addition and formation holding remain distinct from the reserved prospective-waiver question. Docket 26-467 observation ends November 5 with response requested; no disposition is inferred. No Montana jurisdiction application is established.

  • The amended Harris opinion treats formation of the arbitration agreement and formation of the delegation provision as judicial questions. It distinguishes proof of a clear and unmistakable intent to delegate arbitrability from the antecedent question whether a delegation agreement was formed. The court treated delegation and arbitration as agreements severable from the loan contract and each other. Plaintiffs specifically challenged formation of both dispute-resolution agreements while their statutory claims presupposed the loans. The same mutual-assent objection reached each agreement because both bound the arbitrator to the same governing-law provision. The panel affirmed denial of individual arbitration on that contract-specific basis.

    processWebInputExternal.pl · media.ca7.uscourts.gov

  • Harris explains that the FAA supplied no substantive contract-formation rules and that the Otoe-Missouria Tribal Contract Code was adopted in May 2024 after the 2022 and 2023 loans, despite its stated retroactivity. The cited 2018 ordinance did not supply substantive contract rules. The court found mutual assent to essential terms required under either of the competing Illinois or tribal standards on the parties’ briefing and did not choose between them or resolve whether tribal law can replace ordinary state-law formation principles. It distinguished an established legal system subject to change from a body of governing law that did not yet exist and expressly reserved other agreements that may contain different language or alternative substantive law. Its reasoning addresses assent to the two dispute-resolution agreements. The panel expressly made no ruling on standalone enforceability of the governing-law clause or unconscionability.

    processWebInputExternal.pl · media.ca7.uscourts.gov

  • The March 31 opinion already affirmed on formation and reserved whether prospective waiver extends to state-law rights. On June 5 the panel denied the April 28 rehearing and rehearing en banc petition, with no active judge requesting an en banc vote. The companion order identifies the addition of footnote 3 to amended slip page 7. The addition explains that the district court relied solely on prospective waiver, the parties initially briefed that issue, and the appellate panel requested and received supplemental formation briefing before affirming on the narrower, record-supported basis. The amended opinion discusses Viking River Cruises footnote 5 as suggestive and expressly leaves the state-law prospective-waiver question open.

    processWebInputExternal.pl · media.ca7.uscourts.gov processWebInputExternal.pl · media.ca7.uscourts.gov processWebInputExternal.pl · media.ca7.uscourts.gov

  • The Supreme Court’s public docket No. 26-467 identifies Seventh Circuit No. 24-2056 and the June 5, 2026 amended decision. It records an October 5 certiorari petition, an October 29 respondent waiver of response, November 4 distribution for the December 4 conference and a November 5 request for response due December 7, 2026. The saved docket ends its proceedings list with the November 5 entry and contains no grant, denial, or merits disposition. The dated entries do not establish a later conference outcome.

    26-467.html · www.supremecourt.gov

Henry Schein official Supreme Court opinion on delegated arbitrability

Library record saved 2026-11-13

Research scope and limits

Official Supreme Court slip opinion, docket and catalogue identity. No wholly-groundless exception for delegated arbitrability. Preserve validity and clear-and-unmistakable delegation predicates. Actual delegation undecided and remanded.

  • Under the Federal Arbitration Act, the Court rejected the “wholly groundless” exception. When the parties’ agreement delegates the threshold arbitrability issue to an arbitrator, the court may not decide that delegated issue merely because it considers the argument for applying the arbitration agreement wholly groundless. The holding addresses the decisionmaker for arbitrability.

    17-1272_7l48.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

  • Before referral, the Court states that the court determines whether a valid arbitration agreement exists. The agreement must show clear and unmistakable evidence of delegation. Where a valid agreement delegates the arbitrability issue, the court leaves that issue to the arbitrator. The opinion gives no answer on actual delegation under the parties’ contract in this case.

    17-1272_7l48.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

  • On January 8, 2019, Justice Kavanaugh delivered the unanimous opinion in No. 17-1272, reported as 586 U.S. 63. The Court vacated the Fifth Circuit judgment and remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion. The Court of Appeals had not decided delegation and could address it in the first instance on remand, along with Archer and White’s other properly preserved arguments.

    USREPORTS-586-63 · www.govinfo.gov 17-1272.html · www.supremecourt.gov 17-1272_7l48.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov 18 · www.supremecourt.gov

Howsam official opinion on NASD six-year procedural eligibility

Library record saved 2026-11-13

Research scope and limits

Historical NASD eligibility is distinct from a statutory limitation period, any current forum rule, or a particular deadline. Modern FINRA, AAA, other forum editions, litigation-conduct waiver, Montana contract application and actual outcome remain outside this packet. The Court majority’s reasoning is distinguished from Justice Thomas’s separate concurrence in the judgment. Advance only the original Howsam opinion for the earlier finding, including allocation under the historical NASD Code. The underlying eligibility outcome, later treatment, other rules, Montana application and the remainder of the earlier finding remain open.

  • In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002), decided December 10, 2002, Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. Howsam selected NASD arbitration of an investment dispute and signed its Uniform Submission Agreement. The historical NASD Code §10304 used a six-year eligibility period measured from the event or occurrence giving rise to the dispute. Dean Witter sought declaratory and injunctive relief in federal court. The district court dismissed because it viewed the arbitrator as the decisionmaker, and the Tenth Circuit reversed.

    USREPORTS-537-79 · www.govinfo.gov USREPORTS-537-79.pdf · www.govinfo.gov

  • The Court treated whether parties are bound by an arbitration clause, or whether a concededly binding clause covers a particular type of controversy, as the narrow kind of arbitrability questions ordinarily decided by courts unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise. Procedural questions arising from the dispute and bearing on disposition presumptively go to the arbitrator. The Court referred to grievance prerequisites, delay and like defenses, and quoted the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act commentary for examples including time limits, notice, laches and estoppel.

    USREPORTS-537-79.pdf · www.govinfo.gov

  • The Court held that applying the NASD time rule was a procedural gateway matter for the NASD arbitrator. It relied on party expectations and the forum’s comparative expertise. Howsam’s submission agreement incorporated the NASD Code, and the Court read §10304’s eligibility wording alongside §10324’s authority for arbitrators to interpret and decide applicability of Code provisions. It reversed the Tenth Circuit. The decision allocates the eligibility determination and leaves its factual outcome to arbitration.

    USREPORTS-537-79.pdf · www.govinfo.gov

Lamps Plus v. Varela and consent to class arbitration

Library record saved 2026-11-13

Research scope and limits

Supplemental exact claim ranges from original sealed receipts. S04 L6221–6236 includes L6229@P204: A. Preserve original seal and all substantive majority scope limits.

  • In Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, No. 17–988, 587 U.S. 176 (2019), decided April 24, 2019, the federal District Court dismissed the putative class plaintiff’s claims without prejudice and compelled class arbitration over the employer’s request for individual arbitration. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, treating the agreement as ambiguous and applying California’s rule construing ambiguity against the drafter. The Supreme Court accepted the Ninth Circuit’s state-law ambiguity determination, reversed and remanded.

    587BV.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

  • The majority found appellate jurisdiction under FAA §16(a)(3): the district court’s order compelled arbitration and dismissed all pending claims, making it a final decision under Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph. No party had requested a stay. Lamps Plus had standing to appeal because it sought individual arbitration, and the class-arbitration order gave it a personal stake in avoiding the consequences of a fundamentally different procedure.

    587BV.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

  • The FAA requires an affirmative contractual basis for concluding the parties agreed to class arbitration. Ambiguity, like the silence addressed in Stolt-Nielsen, supplies insufficient consent. Although courts ordinarily may rely on state contract principles, the majority held that California’s last-resort contra proferentem rule could not supply the necessary consent. The holding addresses application of that rule to impose class arbitration in the absence of consent.

    587BV.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

  • The majority did not decide whether class arbitration’s availability is a gateway question of arbitrability because the parties agreed to have the court decide it. The jurisdiction discussion did not adjudicate whether the district court should have granted a stay when no party requested one.

    587BV.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

Montana courts’ later uses of Lenz v. FSC Securities

Library record saved 2026-11-13

Research scope and limits

Later official Bucy, Bluebird and Ward citations only. Preserve each attributed Lenz paragraph and arbitration versus insurance scope. Original Lenz official body, disposition and independent holdings held.

  • The Montana Supreme Court’s July 30, 2019 Bucy v. Edward Jones opinion, 2019 MT 173, cites Lenz ¶12 for de novo review under the applicable FAA or Montana Uniform Arbitration Act standard. It distinguishes review under Rule 12(b) or 56 from clear-error review of factual findings and de novo review of legal conclusions after an evidentiary hearing. Bucy also cites Lenz ¶¶17–18 for assent to all essential terms and the court’s threshold role in determining the validity and enforceability of an arbitration agreement.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

  • In 2026 MT 33, Bluebird cited Lenz ¶¶16 and 19 for applying generally applicable state contract and constitutional standards to FAA-governed agreements, and Lenz ¶18 for contract formation by consent. The opinion also cited Lenz ¶19 for the knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver standard under the totality of circumstances and stated that this standard applies to any contractual waiver of a fundamental Montana constitutional right. This verifies how Bluebird used Lenz. Bluebird’s own outcome remains scoped to its loan documents.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

  • In 2019 MT 72, U.S. Specialty Insurance Co. v. Estate of Ward, the Montana Supreme Court cited Lenz ¶29 for the objectively reasonable expectations doctrine as applied to insurance-policy coverage. The court discussed whether policy language or insurer-attributable circumstances would lead an ordinary reasonable person to believe coverage existed. This verifies a separate insurance-specific citation to Lenz. The opinion section does not resolve securities arbitration or Montana debt contracts.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

Monarch v. Petra and waiver through litigation conduct

Library record saved 2026-11-13

Research scope and limits

Preserve Shea majority affirmance and reserved Morgan application. Swanson dissent ¶31 recounts Peeler, separately from the majority.

  • In Monarch Heating and Cooling, LLC v. Petra, Inc., 2025 MT 184, DA 24-0760, decided August 19, 2025, the arbitration clause in the construction subcontract was exercisable at Petra’s sole option. The majority recounted service on Petra’s registered agent May 1, 2024, entry of default May 29, service at its Idaho offices July 1, a joint motion July 25 to set aside the default, and the order granting it July 30. Petra answered, counterclaimed and requested a jury August 20, expressly raised arbitration in its amended answer September 10 and moved to stay and compel October 25. The district court denied that motion December 10.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

  • The majority applied Downey’s knowledge, inconsistent acts and resulting prejudice factors. Knowledge was undisputed. Because Monarch satisfied all three, the majority expressly declined to decide Morgan’s application. Petra’s position that the Montana Uniform Arbitration Act governed is reported as a party argument. The majority did not establish that prejudice applies to every FAA or Montana arbitration waiver.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

  • The majority affirmed the denial of Petra’s motion. It relied on Petra obtaining Monarch’s stipulation to set aside the entry of default without disclosing an intent to compel arbitration and reinforcing that position with its original answer without an express arbitration defense. The majority found prejudice in the time and money spent responding to the counterclaims and especially in Monarch’s surrender of the opportunity to argue prejudice under Montana Rule 55(c) before the entry of default was set aside.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

  • Chief Justice Cory J. Swanson dissented and would have found no waiver and remanded for an order enforcing Petra’s right to arbitrate. The dissent considered the delay following nonforwarding of service, vacating the default, and the counterclaim insufficient on the facts. The discussion recounting Peeler’s presuit settlement efforts and no-waiver outcome in Monarch ¶31 is part of this dissent.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

Montana absence of a business record entry

Library record saved 2026-11-12

Research scope and limits

Actual recordkeeping, trustworthiness, admission or debt status remain unverified.

  • Montana Rule of Evidence 803(7) allows absence of an entry in records kept under Rule 803(6) to prove a matter did not occur or exist if that type of matter was regularly recorded and the records regularly preserved. The exception is unavailable if information sources or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.

    0260-0100-0080-0030.html · mca.legmt.gov

Montana alternative proof of contents

Library record saved 2026-11-12

Research scope and limits

Actual documents, ownership, admission and earlier statewide Rule 9 source gap remain unverified.

  • Montana Rule of Evidence 1004 permits other evidence of contents where no original can be obtained by any available judicial process or procedure, the opponent controlling an original had notice that contents would be a subject of hearing proof and fails to produce it there, or the writing, recording or photograph is not closely related to a controlling issue. The first branch, previously covered generally in S_MT-P15-C042, applies when all originals are lost or destroyed unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith.

    0260-0100-0100-0040.html · mca.legmt.gov

Montana Bluebird opinions on who decides arbitrability and assent

Library record saved 2026-11-12

Research scope and limits

S_MT-P16-Q001 original judicial groups S009 and S010 receive exact selected-text verification in this supplement. The remaining original judicial groups, later treatment, independent page-image inspection, different agreement language, severability, FAA preemption and individual application remain held. The two rulings address successive gateway and merits stages. No private or case-file records were accessed. Two original Montana Supreme Court opinions. Preserve 2024 MT 279 gateway delegation ruling and express merits and choice-of-law reservation, and 2026 MT 33 subsequent formation ruling, Rule 12(d), objective versus retrospective subjective evidence and affirmance limited to the loan documents. Other contract outcomes held.

  • In Bluebird Property Rentals, LLC v. World Business Lenders, LLC, 2024 MT 279, ¶¶10–13, the Montana Supreme Court decided who would determine the challenged arbitration clause’s validity. The parties agreed that the FAA applied. The court stated that the gateway ordinarily belongs to the court unless the parties clearly and unmistakably delegate it. It expressly left the validity of the arbitration and Nevada choice-of-law clauses, and the merits of the case, undecided.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

  • In 2024 MT 279, ¶¶14–21, the court concluded that the broad disputes language and the documents’ limited references to AAA administration and fees did not clearly delegate arbitrability on these facts. The court distinguished Brennan’s express incorporation of the full AAA rules and affirmed the gateway ruling.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

  • In the later Bluebird opinion, 2026 MT 33, ¶¶1–2 and 11–16, the Montana Supreme Court identified the earlier decision as a gateway ruling and reviewed the later denial of a motion to dismiss and compel. It distinguished formation and enforceability from scope and confined the FAA presumption favoring arbitration to the scope branch. The appellant’s motion was converted under Montana Rule 12(d) because the district court considered material outside the pleadings.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

  • In 2026 MT 33, ¶¶19–26, the court read the loan documents together and found reasonable conflicting readings of permissive arbitration and mandatory nonjury-trial language. The opinion allows objective evidence of circumstances when the writing leaves ambiguity and rejects the district court’s use of a party’s retrospective declaration as subjective evidence of intent. It nevertheless upheld the finding of ambiguity and lack of mutual assent based on the documents, including how the dispute-resolution provisions were presented.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

  • In 2026 MT 33, ¶¶26–28, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion to compel. It resolved the ambiguity against the drafter and concluded the provisions at issue did not support knowing, voluntary and intelligent consent to waive the fundamental Montana right. The ruling is tied to the language and presentation of those loan documents.

    getDocByCTrackId · juddocumentservice.mt.gov

Montana certified public records

Library record saved 2026-11-12

Research scope and limits

Other admissibility, qualification of a real copy and debt ownership remain unverified.

  • Montana Rule of Evidence 902(4) dispenses with extrinsic proof of authenticity for a covered public-record copy certified as correct by its custodian or another authorized certifier. Covered material includes an official record, report or entry, and a document legally authorized and actually recorded or filed in a public office, including data compilations. The certificate must comply with Rule 902(1), (2), or (3), covering sealed domestic, unsealed domestic, and foreign public documents, respectively, or with United States or Montana law.

    0260-0100-0090-0020.html · mca.legmt.gov

Montana Rule 1003 copies of regular-course business entries

Library record saved 2026-11-12

Research scope and limits

Rule 1001(5)’s separate definition and any potentially overriding statute are outside this assignment. Current amendments, original authenticity, unfairness, actual admissibility and debt proof remain unverified. Montana Code Annotated 2025, Rule 1003. Increment is regular-course entry copies and the statutory exception. S_MT-P15-C041 already covers duplicate treatment, authenticity, and unfairness. Rule 1001(5) is a reference only. Actual admissibility and debt proof remain unverified.

  • Montana Rule 1003 extends admissibility to a copy of a regular-course business entry as defined in Rule 1001(5), to the same extent as the original and subject to Rule 1003’s exceptions. Those exceptions include a contrary statutory provision.

    0260-0100-0100-0030.html · mca.legmt.gov

Montana justice and city court amendment of service proof

Library record saved 2026-11-12

Research scope and limits

Original statewide form, current Rule 9 chain, later/local procedure and actual service remain held.

  • Under the displayed Montana Justice and City Court Rule 4D(7), a court may in its discretion permit amendment of process or proof of service at any time on notice and terms it considers just, unless material prejudice to substantial rights of the party against whom process issued clearly appears.

    jp_cty_rules_civ_pro.pdf · courts.mt.gov

Montana public-record contents

Library record saved 2026-11-12

Research scope and limits

Current statewide Rule 9 blank and later amendment remain unverified. Actual court admission and debt proof remain outside scope.

  • Montana Rule of Evidence 1005 in the 2025 codifier display permits proof of the contents of an otherwise admissible official record, or a document authorized and actually recorded or filed, by a copy certified under Rule 902 or verified by a witness who compared it with the original. Other evidence of contents is permitted if a compliant copy cannot be obtained through reasonable diligence. The displayed rule history states July 1, 1977 effectiveness.

    0260-0100-0100-0050.html · mca.legmt.gov

Montana Rule 803(8) public records and reports

Library record saved 2026-11-12

Research scope and limits

Rule 803(8) resolves only its hearsay exception. Authentication, contents, statutory application to particular records, actual admission and debt ownership remain unverified. Later amendments are outside the 2025 edition evidence. 2025 Montana codifier Rule 803(8) hearsay exception only. The three categories and five exclusions are distinct from Rule 803(7), Rule 902(4) authentication and Rule 1005 proof of contents. Actual admissibility, records, debt ownership and later amendments remain held.

  • Subject to its exclusions, Montana Rule 803(8) covers public-office or agency material setting out activities regularly conducted and recorded, matters observed under a legal duty that also imposes reporting, or factual findings from a legally authorized investigation.

    0260-0100-0080-0030.html · mca.legmt.gov

  • Rule 803(8) excludes investigative reports by police and other law enforcement personnel, investigative reports prepared by or for a government, public office or agency when offered by that entity in a case in which it is a party, government-offered factual findings in criminal cases, factual findings from special investigations of particular complaints, cases or incidents, and matter whose sources or circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.

    0260-0100-0080-0030.html · mca.legmt.gov

Brown v. Dillard’s and material breach by refusal to arbitrate

Library record saved 2026-11-13

Research scope and limits

Official Brown opinion, assumed allegations and enforceable agreement, material breach of arbitration agreement itself, conditional affirmance and remand. Historical waiver discussion and unconscionability remain outside the finding.

  • The Ninth Circuit’s official published opinion in Brown v. Dillard’s, No. 03-56719, 430 F.3d 1004, bears a December 6, 2005 filing date. The case arose in California employment. Brown invoked the employer’s arbitration program for a wrongful-termination dispute, paid her share of the filing fee, and sued after the employer failed to pay its share and refused to participate. The district court denied the employer’s later motion to compel on an unconscionability ground.

    0356719.pdf · cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov

  • Assuming the allegations and an enforceable agreement for the motion, the panel applied ordinary California contract law through the FAA §2 framework. The employer was required to participate in the properly initiated proceeding for a covered wrongful-discharge claim and could raise merit arguments in that proceeding. The employer’s refusal materially breached the arbitration agreement itself and deprived it of the right to compel arbitration. The panel distinguished breach of an underlying obligation that does not repudiate the arbitration agreement.

    0356719.pdf · cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov

  • The Ninth Circuit conditionally affirmed the denial and remanded, awarding Brown her appellate attorney’s fees. It expressed no view on the district court’s California unconscionability ground. Dillard’s could contest disputed facts on remand to the extent they underlay the breach conclusion. The panel treated material breach as its more accurate ground. Its separate historical waiver discussion is outside the adopted rule.

    0356719.pdf · cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov

Montana Rule 9 official 2017 comparator and bounded rulemaking history

Library record saved 2026-11-12

Research scope and limits

The 2017 order attachment confirms an intermediate version and three exact other-rule orders provide specific history. The full administrative file, any later Rule 9 amendment history after the 2022 compilation and current statewide Rule 9 remain unverified. Historical comparison lead DocId 28468 was not used because this pass did not independently verify a literal public order route and its identity. No reliance on unrelated litigation returned by search. The separate statewide form body and its version, use and acceptance remain open. No private or individual court record, forum, pleading, service or application was investigated. Dated December 2016 comparator and named unrelated-rule orders only. Rule 9 comparison ignores page labels, whitespace and rendering emphasis. Literal history route has no readable body; complete later history, held legislative route, affidavit body and individual use remain held.

Montana voluminous-material summaries

Library record saved 2026-11-12

Research scope and limits

Actual admission, authenticity and debt proof remain unverified.

  • Montana Evidence Rule 1006 permits a chart, summary or calculation of voluminous writings, recordings or photographs that cannot conveniently be examined in court. Other parties must be given access to the originals or duplicates to examine, copy, or both at a reasonable time and place. The court may order their production in court.

    0260-0100-0100-0060.html · mca.legmt.gov

Morgan v. Sundance and the FAA arbitration-waiver prejudice rule

Library record saved 2026-11-13

Research scope and limits

Official Morgan unanimous majority. Preserve rejection of arbitration-specific prejudice rule under assumed federal waiver framework, §6 ordinary procedures, procedural facts, vacatur and remand. Actual waiver and choice of governing framework held.

  • The unanimous Court held that the Eighth Circuit erred by conditioning waiver of the right to arbitrate on prejudice. The FAA policy does not allow federal courts to create arbitration-specific procedural rules. FAA §6 directs the use of the ordinary federal motion procedures, including timeliness rules, unless the FAA provides otherwise. In the assumed federal waiver framework, a party may waive its right to stay litigation or compel arbitration by litigation conduct without a showing of prejudice.

    21-328.html · www.supremecourt.gov 596us1r33_a86c.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

  • In the federal employment action, Sundance moved to dismiss, answered without invoking arbitration and participated in unsuccessful mediation of Morgan’s case. It moved under FAA §§3 and 4 to stay litigation and compel arbitration nearly eight months after the suit began. The District Court found the then-required prejudice and the Eighth Circuit disagreed and sent the matter to arbitration. This is the case’s procedural record as recounted by the Court.

    596us1r33_a86c.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov

  • The Court assumed without deciding that federal waiver law furnished the framework. It left the role of state law and the choice among waiver, forfeiture, estoppel, laches and procedural timeliness open. The remand permitted the Court of Appeals to consider whether Sundance knowingly relinquished its right through inconsistent conduct or whether another framework was appropriate. In No. 21-328, reported at 596 U.S. 411, Justice Kagan delivered the unanimous decision on May 23, 2022, vacating the Eighth Circuit judgment and remanding.

    21-328.html · www.supremecourt.gov 21 · www.supremecourt.gov 596us1r33_a86c.pdf · www.supremecourt.gov